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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 Michael Cerruti pleaded guilty to two counts of child pornography-related charges 
and was sentenced to a below-Guidelines prison term of 84 months.  He now challenges 
the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the District Court improperly 
relied upon rehabilitation concerns in making its decision.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm the judgment of sentence.  
I. 
 In April 2014, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned 
an indictment charging Cerruti with one count of transportation of child pornography, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), and one count of possession of child pornography, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  On January 14, 2016, Cerruti entered an open 
plea of guilty to the charged offenses.  The Presentence Report (“PSR”) prepared by the 
United States Probation Office determined that Cerruti’s total offense level was 34 and 
that his criminal history category was VI.  Taken together, these figures yielded a 
Sentencing Guidelines range of 210-262 months’ imprisonment.   
 Prior to sentencing, Cerruti filed a memorandum requesting that the District Court 
grant a downward variance and impose the mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ 
imprisonment.  In support of his request, Cerruti described his troublesome upbringing 
and difficulties in school.  Cerruti additionally attached to his memorandum two expert 
reports––one prepared by a forensic psychiatrist and the other by a psychologist––
chronicling his severe mental health issues, lengthy substance abuse history, and 
cognitive impairments.  Citing these reports, Cerruti argued that the five-year mandatory 
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minimum, coupled with a ten-year term of supervised release, would be the most 
appropriate sentence. 
The District Court convened a sentencing hearing on October 11, 2016.  Neither 
party objected to the PSR’s calculation. The government, for its part, proposed a 
sentencing range of 151-188 months’ imprisonment, arguing that––although the proposal 
was below the recommended Guidelines range––it was nevertheless a “significant 
sentence,” one that was necessary “to make sure” that Cerruti “[will be] able to abide by 
societies [sic] rules and not further harm children” upon his release.  (App. 40.)  Cerruti, 
in turn, reiterated his mental health problems and “social judgment issues,” again 
requesting that the District Court impose the five-year mandatory minimum sentence 
with “long-term counsel and supervision” upon his release.  Id. at 47, 49.  
After hearing from both sides and taking the parties’ recommendations into 
account, the District Court commenced an analysis of the “factors set forth in 18[] U.S.C. 
[§] 3553(a),” including “the nature and circumstances of the offense committed and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant.”  Id. at 63.  Observing that “child 
pornography . . . [is] one of the most serious crimes that a judge hears,” the District Court 
sought to impose a sentence that reflected the dual aims of “protect[ing] the public from 
further crimes of the defendant” while “provid[ing] the defendant with the needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, [and] . . . other correctional treatment in 
the most effective manner.”  Id. at 63–64.  After reexamining the expert reports, the 
District Court declared that Cerruti “need[ed] a lengthy time of incarceration.  He hasn’t 
even been in the federal system yet to get started, to get acclimated, and to help a true 
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rehabilitation and a true reentry to society.”  Id. at 65.1  The Court then granted a 
significant downward variance from the 210-262-month range under the Guidelines, 
imposing a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment with a ten-year term of supervised 
release.   
Cerruti did not object to the District Court’s sentencing judgment. This timely 
appeal followed.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Because Cerruti did 
not lodge an objection in the District Court, we review the sentencing decisions for plain 
error.  United States v. Flores–Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citing 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)).  “An error is plain if it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ ‘affects substantial 
rights,’ and ‘affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  
Id. at 259 (quoting United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir.2006)). 
III. 
 On appeal, Cerruti argues that the District Court’s sentencing judgment violates 
Tapia v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that “a court may not impose or 
lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or 
otherwise to promote rehabilitation.”  564 U.S. 319, 335 (2011).  Cerruti contends that 
the District Court contravened Tapia by expressing concern over Cerruti’s need for 
                                              
1 At the time of the sentencing hearing, Cerruti had been incarcerated in the 
Lehigh County Jail for 27 months due to parole violations.  
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rehabilitation prior to handing down the 84-month prison term.  Our independent review 
of the record, however, leads us to conclude that no such error occurred.   
 In Tapia, the petitioner was sentenced to a within-Guidelines term of 51 months’ 
imprisonment.  Id. at 321.  In making its sentencing judgment, the district court “referred 
several times to Tapia’s need for drug treatment” and explicitly “indicated that Tapia 
should serve a prison term long enough to qualify for and complete” the Bureau of 
Prison’s Residential 500 Hour Drug Abuse Program.  Id. at 321–22.  On certiorari 
review, the Supreme Court conducted an extensive analysis of the § 3582(a) sentencing 
factors and concluded that they “preclude[] sentencing courts from imposing or 
lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.”  Id. at 332.  The 
Court, however, emphasized that a district court “commits no error by discussing the 
opportunities for rehabilitation within the prison or the benefits of specific treatment or 
training programs.”  Id. at 334.  Thus, § 3582(a) is violated only where the sentencing 
court specifically calculates the length of a sentence to ensure that an offender receives 
certain rehabilitative care or is imprisoned for a period of time sufficient to complete a 
rehabilitative program.  Simply mentioning the potential benefits of participating in such 
a program while imprisoned does not amount to a violation of Tapia.  United States v. 
Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 391 (3d Cir. 2013).     
In Cerruti’s case, he takes issue with the following statements made by the District 
Court at sentencing: 
I do think the defendant needs a lengthy time of incarceration. 
He hasn’t even been in the federal system yet to get started, to 
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get acclimated and to help a true rehabilitation and a true 
reentry to society. 
 
(App. 65.)  These statements, however, do not indicate that the District Court sentenced 
Cerruti for the sole purpose of receiving treatment.  To the contrary, they are direct 
responses to concerns raised by Cerruti in the course of the sentencing hearing regarding 
his mental health, intellectual impairments, and history of substance abuse.  Indeed, 
Cerruti explicitly advised the District Court that “he should undergo counsel for drug 
abuse while he is at the Bureau of Prisons” because “he [hadn’t] really had it since [he’d] 
been in the Lehigh County Jail . . . .”  Id. at 49.  The District Court, after considering 
Cerruti’s past conduct and the relevant § 3553(a) factors, expressed its agreement with 
Cerruti’s sentiments, explaining that a transfer from county prison to federal prison 
would serve Cerruti well because it would allow him to “get acclimated” and receive the 
“true rehabilitation” that he needed.  Id. at 65. 
Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the District Court imposed or lengthened 
Cerruti’s term of imprisonment merely to promote his rehabilitation.  Instead, the District 
Court did precisely as Tapia permits by “trying to get” Cerruti “into an effective drug 
treatment program.”  Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334.  “This type of reference to rehabilitation is, 
under Tapia, both permitted an encouraged.”  Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 392 (citing Tapia, 
564 U.S. at 334).    
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
